HISTORY
OF THE ARMY RESERVES
1. The first
Australian part-time defence units were raised in September 1800. Known as the
Sydney and Parramatta Loyal Associations, they were a response to fears of Irish
and convict uprisings and, later, to concerns about the possibility of French
raids during the Napoleonic Wars. From 1850 to 1900, enthusiasm and Government
support for volunteer defence forces waxed and waned, largely in accordance with
perceptions of external threat. During the Crimean War, Victoria raised
voluntary rifle and cavalry units. New South Wales recruited a battalion of
riflemen and a battery of artillery, primarily to man the expanded
fortifications around Sydney Harbour.
2. By 1863 these two colonies had mustered over 5,000 volunteers. These
part-time troops were not paid directly for their service but were entitled to a
Government grant of 50 acres of land on completion of five years ‘efficient’
service. In contrast to the mostly poor and squalid backgrounds of the British
regular troops garrisoned in the colonies, the local volunteers drew heavily on
the rising urban and rural middle classes. A large proportion of this local
force consisted of artisans and skilled labourers. Volunteering members needed
to pay the costs of their uniforms and cover their wages forgone. They were also
free to resign at any time and unit discipline was usually less than stringent.
The Government’s prime obligation was to provide appropriate weaponry
3. During the 1860s 2,500 men from the eastern Australian colonies
volunteered for service in the Waikato War against the Maoris in New Zealand.
Many of these individuals had experience in the colonial volunteer forces.
During this period security scares were not only stimulated by distant European
wars but also by rumours of the approach of foreign naval vessels. A continuing
colonial nightmare was the early morning appearance in the port approaches of a
foreign warship which was able to shell the coastal cities with virtual
impunity. In 1839 two American warships did, in fact, anchor overnight in Sydney
Harbour undetected. In 1878 there was mild panic when an Italian cruiser
appeared unexpectedly off Sydney Heads.
4. The departure of the last British troops from Australia in 1870
precipitated the raising of a new category of local military force. While the
‘volunteers’ provided a basic local defence capacity for a very modest cost,
successive reviews of defence preparation in the colonies highlighted a need for
higher standards of training, stricter discipline and the introduction of more
modern equipment. The gold rushes and associated economic prosperity also
generated a climate in which colonial administrations felt that they could
afford to build more capable defence units. Consequently, volunteers were sought
for a new, partially paid, colonial militia force. Militia volunteers were
supplied with uniforms and essential equipment as well as cash payments for
periods of service. In return, the training periods for these units were
compulsory and their exercising and discipline were far more rigorous than for
the ‘volunteers’.
5. The Australian colonies were very cautious about raising regular
military units. There was a widespread aversion to the dangers of militarism and
wariness about the potential for permanent defence forces to be used to suppress
workers’ movements. There was also little interest in generating an officer
‘caste’ along the lines fostered by the British. Most Australians did not want
to compromise their egalitarian spirit by creating a more formal, permanent,
professional military force. Thus when the first full-time defence units were
raised in some of the colonies in the 1870s, they were very small in size and
tasked with supporting the much larger militias, primarily in manning the
expanded network of coastal fortifications. This meant that by the 1880s the
following categories of military service existed in several of the colonies:
permanent, militia, volunteer and school cadet and rifle club reserves.
DEPRESSION OF THE 1890’S
6. The economic Depression of the 1890s brought a severe reduction in
spending on defence, reduced manning levels, cuts in militia and permanent force
pay and severely curtailed training periods. The Depression also brought serious
industrial disturbances which led the Victorian and Queensland Governments to
call out troops to reinforce State police. These operations against strikers
exacerbated the distrust of large segments of the population of the military.
THE SUDAN
7. The New South Wales commitment of forces to the Sudan in 1885 and the
commitments of all six colonies to South Africa in 1899 required calls for
volunteers for overseas service. Many, but not all, of those who volunteered had
previous militia or volunteer experience. During the Boer War, eight contingents
totalling some 16,175 men left Australia for South Africa. This experience
fostered a popular belief that young Australian men, especially those from rural
areas, possessed natural bush skills that made them ‘born’ soldiers.
THE BOER WAR
8. The experience of the Boer War, however, suggested that, while
Australians possessed many valuable natural attributes, thorough training and
appropriate equipment were also essential. While the first two contingents
acquitted themselves well, the latter contingents were less experienced and
weaknesses in training and discipline became apparent.
FEDERATION
9. At the federation of the Australian colonies on 1 January 1901,
responsibility for defence passed from the individual colonies to the new
Federal Government. In terms of manpower, the national government inherited a
total of 29,000 soldiers (including 1,500 on full-time duty) and 2,000 naval
personnel (including 250 on full-time duty).
10. The resounding Japanese naval victory over Russian forces in the
North-west Pacific in 1905 and the withdrawal of British capital ships from the
theatre following conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance again stirred
Australian feelings of vulnerability and encouraged an expansion of Australia’s
defences. W.M. Hughes had for some years been urging adoption of compulsory
part-time military service because he saw it as a means of society as a whole
enhancing its security while avoiding the propagation of militarism, the threat
that armed forces might be used against the workers and disruption to business
and civil life. In 1909 Field Marshal Lord Kitchener was invited to review
Australia’s defences and provide professional comment on the proposed compulsory
military training scheme. His report foresaw the possibility that in a future
crisis the Royal Navy might be distracted elsewhere and Australia may need to
provide the main forces for its own defence.
COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE
11. He endorsed the compulsory military service scheme and called for
increasing the size of the Australian militia army to 80,000 men. The Government
accepted the thrust of his report and 92,000 18-25 year olds boosted the ranks
of the militia by commencing part-time training in 1911.
RMC DUNTROON
12. An important parallel development during this period was the
establishment of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, to provide staff officers
and instructors for the growing militia army. By the outbreak of war in 1914,
over 200,000 Australians were on full- or part-time service. It was not
possible, however, for the existing army units to be committed directly to
hostilities.
THE COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE
ACT
13. The Commonwealth Defence Act precluded the dispatch of any but
volunteers for overseas service. Therefore, in raising a special force to
capture German New Guinea and in creating the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) to
serve in Europe and the Middle East, the Government appealed to the entire
population for recruits. In the event, a large number of volunteers and
compulsorily trained militia made themselves available. A notable feature of the
Australian forces committed to World War I was the quality and effectiveness of
many of the senior citizen force officers. Monash and other officers of high
calibre were the product of long periods of militia training. They believed
strongly that their part-time backgrounds rendered them more suitable for high
command than permanent officers. The vast human costs of the war, the divisive
wartime plebiscites on compulsory overseas service and the apparent opportunity
for post-war arms control generated strong pressures to cut defence expenditure
in the early 1920s.
14. Nevertheless, compulsory militia training for home service continued
until 1929. Its cessation placed unexpectedly sudden pressure on the volunteer
force. The great depression further reduced defence spending over the following
three years, bringing the armed forces to their lowest strength in the inter-war
period. In the mid-1930s the rise of Hitler and Japan’s operations in China
revived concerns in Australia about the likelihood of a new world war. Defence
expenditures rose at an increasing rate towards the end of the decade. By 1939
Australia’s Army consisted of 3,000 permanent personnel and 80,000
under-equipped, part-time citizen force volunteers.
WORLD WAR II
15. At the outbreak of World War II neither the Government nor the
Opposition was enthusiastic about introducing compulsory overseas military
service. So in raising forces for overseas service (the Second AIF) volunteers
were again sought from the general community. Militia were encouraged to
transfer to the AIF, but only about one quarter did so. The remainder continued
to serve in Australia. Thus, at the beginning of the World War II, Australia
effectively maintained no less than three armies: the Second AIF, an
all-volunteer force eligible for overseas service anywhere; a militia, which was
ineligible for service outside Australia; and the permanent Army, which was a
relatively small force of volunteer personnel.
16. The distinctions between the militia and the other forms of service
were subsequently modified in February 1943, when legislation was passed
extending the region in which the militia was liable for service to include the
entire South-West Pacific area, excluding the Philippines, West Java and North
Borneo. Many militia units subsequently distinguished themselves in combat
overseas. Nevertheless, this differentiation within Army remained a continuing
source of friction.
17. Many developments during World War II had long-term consequences for
the future shape of the Australian Defence Force. One important development was
the growth of a close and enduring strategic relationship with the United
States, which was predicated on defending Australian and allied interests on an
almost continuous basis in forward Asian theatres. Another was the increasing
complexity and technological sophistication of modern war, which encouraged the
application of higher levels of technical expertise to the profession of arms. A
third was that, in contrast to World War I, the permanent Staff Corps officers
gradually gained the ascendancy in senior Australian command positions. A fourth
important consequence was that World War II accelerated greatly the
industrialisation of the Australian economy and established the foundations for
relative prosperity in the late 1940s and through the 1950s.
18. Accordingly, when the post-war shape of the Defence Force came to be
discussed seriously in 1945, the conditions were different in many respects from
those of the 1930s. Moreover, the Government of the day urgently wished to
commit a brigade of volunteer troops to the British Commonwealth Occupation
Force in Japan. These volunteers were drawn from veterans of the demobilising
6th, 7th and 9th Divisions of the AIF and signed up as permanent personnel. This
was, in effect, a major break with Australian military tradition. Militia and
other volunteers were not sought to fill this commitment. It soon became clear
that permanent soldiers were no longer to be merely assistants and facilitators
for the much larger citizen militia.
FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARA
19. The Australian Regular Army (ARA) was
formally established in 1947 with its own organisation and front-line role. The
permanent infantry brigade of three battalions committed to Japan was to form
the core of the Regular Army during the late 1940s and through the 1950s. By
1949 the Regular Army numbered some 15,000 troops. A part-time force was
re-established in 1948 with the traditional part-time training obligations of
evening parades, weekend ‘bivouacs’ and an annual 14-day continuous training
camp.
20. The Regular Army continued to provide the CMF with limited support,
primarily in the form of a training cadre. The crisis in Korea led the
Australian Government to commit first one and then two regular infantry
battalions to the conflict. Coming on top of the requirement to provide
substantial continuing support to the CMF, the Regular Army was stretched
severely.
NATIONAL SERVICE
21. Additional training demands were imposed by the Government’s decision,
in March 1951, to expand the CMF through a compulsory national service scheme.
The Government announced that it was deeply disturbed by the rise of
international communism and it saw an urgent need to take precautionary steps
against the possibility of a new global conflict. Under this scheme, all male
British subjects were liable for call up at 18 years of age for 176 days
training in the Citizen Naval Forces, Citizen Military Forces or the Citizen Air
Force.
22. For the Army, 98 days initial continuous training was required,
followed by 12 days part-time training and a 14-day continuous training camp in
each of the succeeding three years. Some 34,500 young men were called up in the
first year. This number was far beyond the training capacity of the Regular
personnel that, owing to the Korean War, were available. The military value of
the scheme was limited. In 1955 the period of obligatory CMF service was reduced
to 140 days and the scheme was suspended altogether in 1959. By the end of 1960,
CMF strength had fallen to 20,000. During the 1950s the political influence of
the ‘CMF lobby’ was strong.
23. Rivalries with the Regular officer corps were frequently intense and,
at one point during this decade, a serious attempt was made to have a CMF
officer appointed as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). An important turning
point in the history of the CMF came in 1959-1960. Not only was national service
suspended, but also the Army introduced a Pentropic organisation, modelled on a
similar US Army formation that was then in vogue. This heavy restructuring of
the Army caused a contraction in the number of CMF battalions, changes in many
unit names and a loss of esprit de corps. Many veterans from World War II
resigned from the CMF during this period. In July 1962 Australia deployed 30
Regular Army advisers to South Vietnam, and in 1965 this commitment rose to
battalion strength.
24. In 1965 Australia also had the Malaysia Battalion in East Malaysia to
counter Indonesian operations against East Malaysia. The Australian Army was
rapidly becoming over-stretched in two simultaneous and relatively open-ended
conflicts. In order to expand rapidly the capabilities of the Regular Army,
Prime Minister Menzies announced in November 1964 the introduction of a new
compulsory, but selective, national service scheme. This facilitated a build up
of the Regular Army to nine battalions by 1967.
24. The introduction of national service had major consequences for the
CMF. Under the national service legislation, men who joined the CMF before their
age group was balloted were exempt from the national service call up but were
required to spend six years in CMF service. This meant that many young men
joined the CMF out of a desire to avoid national service, rather than contribute
to the CMF. Hence, even though CMF enlistments rose rapidly during the latter
half of the 1960s, the effectiveness of the force did not rise in parallel.
ABOLITION OF NATIONAL
SERVICE
26. The abolition of the national service scheme in 1972 was one of the
first acts of the new Whitlam Government. This left the CMF as a rapidly
reducing force (as forced entrants withdrew) and with a clouded future role. In
an effort to clarify the situation, Dr T.B. Millar was appointed in May 1973 to
head a committee to inquire into the future of the CMF. The Millar Report was
the most comprehensive review of Australian Defence Force Reserves since at
least World War II. Its principal conclusions and recommendations were that:
primarily in the form of a training cadre. The crisis in Korea led the
Australian Government to commit first one and then two regular infantry
battalions to the conflict. Coming on top of the requirement to provide
substantial continuing support to the CMF, the Regular Army was stretched
severely.
in March 1951, to expand the CMF through a compulsory national service scheme.
The Government announced that it was deeply disturbed by the rise of
international communism and it saw an urgent need to take precautionary steps
against the possibility of a new global conflict. Under this scheme, all male
British subjects were liable for call up at 18 years of age for 176 days
training in the Citizen Naval Forces, Citizen Military Forces or the Citizen Air
Force.
followed by 12 days part-time training and a 14-day continuous training camp in
each of the succeeding three years. Some 34,500 young men were called up in the
first year. This number was far beyond the training capacity of the Regular
personnel that, owing to the Korean War, were available. The military value of
the scheme was limited. In 1955 the period of obligatory CMF service was reduced
to 140 days and the scheme was suspended altogether in 1959. By the end of 1960,
CMF strength had fallen to 20,000. During the 1950s the political influence of
the ‘CMF lobby’ was strong.
at one point during this decade, a serious attempt was made to have a CMF
officer appointed as Chief of the General Staff (CGS). An important turning
point in the history of the CMF came in 1959-1960. Not only was national service
suspended, but also the Army introduced a Pentropic organisation, modelled on a
similar US Army formation that was then in vogue. This heavy restructuring of
the Army caused a contraction in the number of CMF battalions, changes in many
unit names and a loss of esprit de corps. Many veterans from World War II
resigned from the CMF during this period. In July 1962 Australia deployed 30
Regular Army advisers to South Vietnam, and in 1965 this commitment rose to
battalion strength.
counter Indonesian operations against East Malaysia. The Australian Army was
rapidly becoming over-stretched in two simultaneous and relatively open-ended
conflicts. In order to expand rapidly the capabilities of the Regular Army,
Prime Minister Menzies announced in November 1964 the introduction of a new
compulsory, but selective, national service scheme. This facilitated a build up
of the Regular Army to nine battalions by 1967.
CMF. Under the national service legislation, men who joined the CMF before their
age group was balloted were exempt from the national service call up but were
required to spend six years in CMF service. This meant that many young men
joined the CMF out of a desire to avoid national service, rather than contribute
to the CMF. Hence, even though CMF enlistments rose rapidly during the latter
half of the 1960s, the effectiveness of the force did not rise in parallel.
first acts of the new Whitlam Government. This left the CMF as a rapidly
reducing force (as forced entrants withdrew) and with a clouded future role. In
an effort to clarify the situation, Dr T.B. Millar was appointed in May 1973 to
head a committee to inquire into the future of the CMF. The Millar Report was
the most comprehensive review of Australian Defence Force Reserves since at
least World War II. Its principal conclusions and recommendations were that:
a.
A partly trained Reserve force was
an essential component of the defence of Australia;
b.
The Citizen Military Forces should
be renamed the Army Reserve;
c.
Australia should have one Army (ie
total force) with two complementary elements, the Regular Army and the Army
Reserve;
d.
The Army Reserve should be developed
to provide an effective operational force for the defence of Australia at short
notice and also to provide a basis for force expansion in the long term;
e.
Many Army Reserve units should be
amalgamated to make better use of the available manpower;
f.
Chief of Army Reserves should be
appointed to the Department of Defence (Army Office);
g.
A Committee for Employer Support
should be established, with an element in each State; and
h.
Numerous detailed steps should be
taken to, for example, improve training, structures, recruitment and
administrative procedures.
27. The Government accepted
Millar’s principal recommendations and most were planned to be implemented
progressively over the following decade. The 1976 White Paper Australian Defence
reaffirmed the Government’s support for Millar’s recommendations and predicted
that the ongoing reorganisation would raise the effectiveness of the Army
Reserve. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the
Government announced an expansion of Army Reserve numbers to 30,000.
28. This policy, however, was not sustained. Another cause of decreased
strength was the removal – albeit for less than a year – of the tax exempt
status of Reserve pay in the 1983-84 budget. By the mid-1980s the effective
strength of the Army Reserve had stabilised at about 25,000. A review of all
reserve units was conducted in 2001 and consolidated Army Reserve numbers to a
liability of 21 000. This reduced the hollowness of reserve units while aligning
equipment to the roles and tasks of the unit.
29. Reservists continue to play a fundamental part in all activities and
operations conducted by Army as evidenced in their participation in overseas
deployments and internal exercises and activities.
strength was the removal – albeit for less than a year – of the tax exempt
status of Reserve pay in the 1983-84 budget. By the mid-1980s the effective
strength of the Army Reserve had stabilised at about 25,000. A review of all
reserve units was conducted in 2001 and consolidated Army Reserve numbers to a
liability of 21 000. This reduced the hollowness of reserve units while aligning
equipment to the roles and tasks of the unit.
operations conducted by Army as evidenced in their participation in overseas
deployments and internal exercises and activities.